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Red Banking: Chinese State-Owned 
Commercial Bank Reform and the Basel II 
Accord 
Christopher D. Luehr* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In October 2008, China celebrated the 60th anniversary of 
the founding of the People’s Republic of China.1 The celebration 
at Tiananmen Square featured many familiar staples of the 
National Day ceremony—soldiers marching in perfect unison, 
children performing traditional Chinese dances, and countless 
displays of affection for “the Great Helmsman,” Mao Zedong.2 
Despite the fanfare, one wonders that if Mao were aware of the 
changes that have taken place in the Communist empire he 
built, he might turn over in his glass-encased grave. On 
National Day, young people don Mao hats adorned with red 
stars, but outside these celebrations they are more likely to 
wear baseball caps with Nike swooshes. The Central Chinese 
Communist Party (CCCP) still maintains power, but the 
fundamental tenets of the party that Mao established have been 
massaged or have given way to modern ideas of free market and 
personal wealth. Though the “Five Star Red Flag” Mao hoisted 
on the first National Day in 1949 still waves over “Red China,” 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Minnesota Law School; M.A., Columbia 
University, 2005; B.A., Macalester College, 2001. The author thanks the editors and 
staff of the MJIL for their dedication and assistance improving this article. He also 
thanks his family and friends who supported him during the writing process.  
 1. Michael Wines, On Day for Chinese Pride, Little Interest in Ideology, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at A10. 
 2. See Sharon LaFraniere, No Detail Is Overlooked as China Prepares to 
Celebrate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A4; See also Emily Rauhala, Mao: The 
Great Helmsman of Kitsch?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/01/world/asia/01iht-mao.html (discussing the 
variety of Mao Zedong memorabilia for sale). 
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the country is significantly less “red” than it was sixty years 
ago.3 
The financial reforms that occurred since the “Opening Up” 
period of the 1980s have ushered in a new era of market 
capitalism in the former communist stronghold.4 The difficulties 
accompanying these massive changes have shifted the economy 
even farther from its centrally-planned roots and the transition 
continues to send ripples through the domestic and 
international economies.5 Not surprisingly, this movement 
necessitated sweeping changes in the banking system.6 The 
state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) dominate the country’s 
financial landscape due in part to their fifty-four percent 
ownership of all banking assets in China.7 The SOCBs also 
share a special relationship with the Central Government and 
often play the dual and sometimes conflicting roles of test pilot 
and mouthpiece for new regulations.8 One such set of 
regulations implements the recommendations of the Basel 
Committee, an international body established in 1974 “to 
enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve 
the quality of banking supervision worldwide.”9 The latest 
 
 3. 1949: Highlight of the PRC Founding Ceremony, CHINACULTURE.ORG, 
http://www.chinaculture.org/focus/2009-09/09/content_347434.htm (last visited Sept. 
24, 2010). 
 4. See Douglas Zhihua Zeng, China’s Employment Challenges and Strategies 
After the WTO Accession, (World Bank, Working Paper No. 3522, 2005) (discussing 
the growing economy since entrance into the WTO). 
 5. Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China’s Capacity to Implement 
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18 
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 399, 415–16 (2002). 
 6. See YUANYUAN PENG, THE CHINESE BANKING INDUSTRY 29–36 (2007) 
(noting that in recent years several prominent state-owned commercial banks 
suffered corruption scandals, some of which effected transactions with banks around 
the world). 
 7. See Yan Li & Yumin Zhuang, The Reform of State-Owned Commercial 
Banks in China, Presentation at ASEAN+3 Workshop on Reform and Development 
of Banking System in China (May 24–26, 2005), available at 
http://www.afdc.org.cn/afdc/cn/UploadFile/200932535829469.ppt [hereinafter 
Zhuang & Li, Reform of State-Owned Commercial Banks] (presentation containing 
asset percentage statistics distributed by the People’s Bank of China). 
 8. Two of the main banks were the country’s first to engage in international 
transactions, and more recently have been the first subjected to new capital 
adequacy requirements. See INST. OF FIN. & BANKING, CHINESE ACAD. OF SOC. SCIS., 
CHINA’S BANKING & FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE INTERNAL RESEARCH REPORTER OF 
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT 74–76 (Li Yang & Robert Kuhn eds., 2007). 
 9. About the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
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regulations, the “International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards” (Basel II), set forth 
provisions for assessing risk and calculating capital adequacy.10 
The seemingly narrow measurement belies the great complexity 
of the resulting provisions and their broad influence on the 
banking world in China and worldwide. 
This Article seeks to explore the implications of Basel II not 
only on the SOCBs’ capital adequacy but also their corporate 
governance. The background section tracks the evolution of 
SOCBs over the last couple decades, while also looking at the 
Central Government’s historical approaches to international 
standards. Section I of the analysis explains how the specificity 
of Basel II’s capital adequacy requirements will create stronger 
capital assets and diminish instances of bank corruption among 
SOCB managers.11 In Section II, the supervisory review 
requirements are shown to advance China’s recent pursuit of 
stronger corporate governance practices. Section III explores 
how the nonbinding international standards engendered a new 
legal framework in China for regulating banks even before the 
standards themselves were adopted as law. The final section 
posits that China’s interest in greater global economic power 
will compel full compliance with international regulations, 
evidenced by their accelerated implementation of Basel II. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE-OWNED 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
A. COMMUNIST BANKING PRACTICES AND EARLY REFORMS  
 
The history of China in the twentieth century and the 
important changes in the twenty-first reflect the intimate 
relationship between law, politics and economics in the Middle 
Kingdom.  The twentieth century saw China’s government move 
from imperialism to fragile democracy to communism, the last of 
which has undergone major reforms since the founding of the 
 
 10. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, at Introduction, ¶¶ 1, 
4–7 (June 2004) [hereinafter Basel II]. 
 11. For a discussion of recent fraud committed by upper level SOCB managers, 
see PENG, supra note 6, at 29–36. 
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People’s Republic of China in 1949.12 Each political transition 
brought new thoughts and different economic systems, which 
directly influenced banking practices and the legal regulation 
thereof.13 The movement back and forth between centralization 
and diversification illustrates the ideological shifts regarding 
Chinese banking and the attendant changes in corporate 
governance.14 During the first decade of Communist rule, the 
government consolidated all banking control under the People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC).15 The PBOC managed all banking and 
monetary policy throughout the entire country.16 While the 
PBOC remained the sole bank in the country for a number of 
years, eventually the National People’s Congress formed three 
other large state-owned commercial banks—the China 
Construction Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the 
Industrial and Commercial Banks of China—creating what is 
now called “The Big Four.”17 The Big Four’s main purpose was 
to fund the policies of the Central Planning Committee, and in 
this sense, they did not operate like modern banks at all. 
Instead of managing risks, incentivizing savings, or performing 
other financial services, these institutions essentially served as 
state credit-granting agencies blindly funding government 
projects.18 
During the early decades of Communist rule in China, the 
Central Government dominated corporate governance in all 
companies, including the banking industry.19 During this time, 
corporate governance took the form of the Central Government 
handing out marching orders to Communist party officials 
serving as owners, supervisors, managers, and creditors of 
 
 12. See generally, Duncan, supra note 5, at 402–06, 411–30 (highlighting recent 
changes in the Chinese legislative and administrative systems). 
 13. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM IN POST-WTO CHINA 14–15 
(James R. Barth et al. eds., 2007) (tracking the changes in SOCBs since the days of 
Mao’s rule). [hereinafter FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING]. 
 14. Id. (explaining the strong central control of the People’s Bank of China and 
subsequent diversification and recentralization over the past couple decades). 
 15. HAIQUN YANG, BANKING AND FINANCIAL CONTROL IN REFORMING PLANNED 
ECONOMIES 13 (1996). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING , supra note 13, at 10, 12; ZHONGFEI ZHOU, 
BANKING LAWS IN CHINA, at xxi (2007). 
 18. FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 10–11. 
 19. See Yuwa Wei, An Overview of Corporate Governance in China, 30 
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 23, 29 (2003) (discussing the Communist 
nationalization of corporations and death of private ownership). 
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businesses.20 Eventually, many problems arose from this 
centrally-planned system.21 In addition to the problems of the 
State assuming several conflicting roles, there was a general 
absence of discipline or incentive mechanisms for state-run 
companies to maximize economic efficiency.22 
Without legal ramifications for shirking fiduciary duties, 
managers focused more on lining their own pockets, and thus, 
allowed their banks to approve extremely high risk loans to 
those who could provide political favors.23 Also, knowledge that 
the central government would simply issue more loans if ever 
they faced economic hardship undercut any motivation for the 
banks to increase productivity or profit.24 Concentrating control 
over the SOCBs in the Central Committee mirrored the 
philosophy upon which the country was founded, but the 
practical application proved less than satisfactory.25 
The chronic lack of efficiency and achievement during the 
early decades of the People’s Republic of China lead the once 
staunchly communist regime to rethink its methods.26 The 
result was the “Opening Up” period, the gradual economic 
liberation that began under the leadership of Deng Xiaopeng in 
1978.27 During this period China took its first shaky steps away 
from centrally-planned economics and toward the increasingly 
integrated world of free trade.28 Recognizing the need to 
embrace the free market in order to build a stronger nation, 
China reformed many of its economic policies and moved toward 
 
 20. Id. at 32. 
 21. See HAIQUN YANG, BANKING AND FINANCIAL CONTROL IN REFORMING 
PLANNED ECONOMIES 21–24 (1996) (generalizing that all centrally controlled 
economies eventually fall victim to the similar patterns of low profitability and 
subpar production levels); ZHONGFEI ZHOU,  BANKING LAWS IN CHINA, at xx–xxii 
(2007) (explaining the chronic inefficiency and underperformance for SOCBs and 
other state-owned enterprises). 
 22. Wei, supra note 19, at 32–33. See also PENG, supra note 6, at 8-108–10 
(discussing conflicting roles and other problems facing state-owned 
banks).banks).banks). 
 23. See PENG, supra note 6, at 3, 29–31 (discussing bribery and fraud in 
Chinese banks and detailing the specific case of issuing risky loans in the BOC 
Shanghai branch). 
 24. Id. at 12–13. 
 25. See id. at 7 (“[S]tate-owned banks are facing daunting challenges . . . .”). 
 26. See Wei, supra note 19, at 30 (discussing economic reforms and 
corporatization during the 1970s and 1980s). 
 27. See INST. OF FIN. & BANKING, supra note 8, at 3. 
 28. See generally NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL &  WUDUNN, CHINA WAKES: 
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A RISING POWER (1994). 
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privatization.29 In the banking world, this lead to tentative 
liberalization and diversification including a more limited role 
for the PBOC, and  the creation of the other three state banks, 
which were eventually allowed to run as fully-functioning 
businesses.30 Throughout the 1980s, the government slowly gave 
banks more agency over their business dealings, which allowed 
the institutions to grow and set up local branches throughout 
the nation.31 The incremental reform ushered in the first wave 
of Chinese economic growth, during which industries and banks 
flung off the shackles of government control, or at least enjoyed 
a slightly longer leash.32 The creation of the new, free enterprise 
system demanded a new legal framework that would allow the 
government to maintain strong control while giving businesses 
more freedom.33 In 1986, the Central Government’s State 
Council issued the “Provisional Regulations on the Control of 
Banks,” the first comprehensive legislation regulating the 
Chinese banking industry.34 Yet, the first round of reforms only 
mitigated, and did not eliminate, the problems that plagued the 
early communist-era industries.35 
B. ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE MID-90S REFORMS 
As China’s influence and economy grew, so too did the 
demand for further reform of the financial system.36  The banks 
could not support the rapid liberalization and privatization that 
both lead China to this period of relative prosperity and were 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. See PENG, supra note 6, at 13. 
 31. Id. at 14–15. 
 32. SeeYANG, supra note 15, at 67 (discussing independence of central banks 
during transition). 
 33. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 16 (explaining the new 
banking regulations following the enactment of the PBOC). 
 34. Provisional Regulations on the Control of Banks (promulgated by the State 
Council, Jan. 7, 1986, effective Jan. 7, 1986) ASIAN LEGAL INFO. INST.(China), 
available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/protcob477/. 
 35. See Zhongfei Zhou & Jingwei Li, In Search of Approaches to Improving 
Corporate Governance in China's State-Owned Commercial Banks, 36 INT’L LAW. 
215, 224–25 (2002) (forming sound corporate governance as an issue still plaguing 
banks today). 
 36. See Lawrence L. C. Lee, Adoption and Application of a "Soft Law" Banking 
Supervisory Framework Based on the Current Basle Accords to the Chinese Economic 
Area, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 687, 687–88 (1997)7 (growing financial markets in general 
necessitate increased supervision). 
LUEHR fixed 12/10/2010  2:12 PM 
2011] RED BANKING: CHINA AND BASEL II 177 
 
pushing it toward greater growth.37  Free from the constraints of 
policy lending, the Big Four state-owned commercial banks now 
needed to rework their own internal structures in order to 
continue their aggressive pursuit of modernized banking 
practices and the related goal of accession to the WTO.38 
This began with centralizing the structure which had 
previously let local branches operate too far outside the control 
of the PBOC.39 One such problem was the habit of many local 
officials essentially using the state-owned banks as local policy 
banks, which in turn lead to a great increase in the percentage 
of non-performing loans taken on by the local branches.40  These 
and other troubles spurred the government to pass a second 
wave of banking laws in China in the mid-90s, the “Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China” and 
the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial 
Banking.”41  While this eliminated the agency problems at the 
local level, the laws were vague and lacked the strength 
necessary to instill proper corporate governance in the SOCBs 
from the top down.42 
While the historic passing of the banking laws constituted a 
large step toward industry reform, the decade would bring more 
warnings that the system needed further reform to fully realize 
its potential. The Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 provided a 
 
 37. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 9–11 (discussing the 
evolution of banking system due to globalization and shift to market economy). 
 38. Id. at 12–13. 
 39. Id. at 10–11, 15. Cf.  CHINA’S FINANCIAL TRANSITION AT A CROSSROADS 87 
(Charles W. Calomiris ed., 2007) (stating that China’s recentralization is the cause 
of their economic troubles). 
 40. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 13–14 (discussing 
inefficient lending practices by local banking institutions). 
 41. See id. at 16–17 (noting the promulgation of the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China and Law People’s Republic of China 
on Commercial Banking); Zhonghuá rénmín gònghéguó zhongguó rénmíng yínháng 
fa (中华人民共和国中国人民银行法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
People’s Bank of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Mar. 18, 1995, effective Mar. 18, 1995) 
http://www.isinolaw.com/isinolaw/detail_ce.jsp?iscatalog=0&statutes_id=131692&ch
annelid=76608&skind=110&catalogid= (China); Zhonghuá rénmín gònghéguó 
shangyè yínháng fa (中华人民共和国商业银行法) [Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Commercial Banks] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., May 10, 1995, effective July 1, 1995) 
http://www.isinolaw.com/isinolaw/detail_ce.jsp?iscatalog=0&statutes_id=131692&ch
annelid=76608&skind=110&catalogid= (China). 
 42. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 16–19 (noting specific 
weaknesses in the newly promulgated laws). 
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wake-up call for the entire region, including the Chinese 
government leaders.43 The Chinese took stock of their current 
financial sector and realized that further reforms were 
necessary to avoid the problems that crippled their Asian 
neighbors.44  Thus, after a period of recentralization, China 
began to diversify its financial practices, always keeping an eye 
on WTO.45 
Important reforms during this time included the 
introduction of the asset liability management system, which 
replaced the old credit planning system still lingering from the 
early communist days.46  Also, as part of the plan to gain 
credibility in the eyes of the WTO members, the government 
improved its banks’ capital adequacy by complying with the first 
Basel Committee’s “The International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards,” or Basel II.47 Compliance 
here necessitated an injection of 270 billion renminbi 
(approximately $39 billion USD) into the SOCBs.  This measure 
along with the other reforms implemented by the PRC, 
eventually helped China gain accession into the WTO.48 
C. ENTERING THE FREY: WTO ACCESSION AND POST-WTO 
REFORMS 
 
 43. See PENG, supra note 6, at 1 (noting the effect the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis had on the policies and attitude with respect to financial regulations amongst 
China’s leadership). 
 44. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 20. 
 45. Id. (discussing a series of administrative regulations that took place to 
bring Chinese regulations in line with international standards); Raj Bhala, Enter the 
Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469, 
1491–92 (2000) (discussing the conflict between China’s SOEs and banks and the 
initiative taken by the PRC to remedy this conflict in order to appeal to the WTO, in 
particular the United States, which was already a sitting member of the WTO and it 
did not approve of China’s SOE policies). 
 46. FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 15; See Lee, supra note 36, at 
729 (discussing the need for China to develop a more stable banking system since it 
will serve as the foundation for China’s future economic development). 
 47. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 124 (discussing China’s 
implementation of Basel as part of its larger measure to place its bank system in 
line with international standards); See also Basel II, supra note 10, at Introduction, 
¶ 1–4 (discussing implementation of framework to measure capital and determine 
capital adequacy). 
 48. See ZHOU, supra note 17, at xxi (discussing issuance of special government 
bonds to recapitalize the big four to end the dependence of SOEs on government 
subsidies); Bhala, supra note 45, at 1481 (noting the demands made by the WTO of 
the PRC to become a working member, specifically the issue of government subsidies 
to SOEs). 
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In a reverse of the early communist era stance, the 
government made the previously mentioned reforms in the late 
1990s to make the country more competitive and better able to 
engage other countries on the world stage.49 An important 
transition in that process has been the changes made to gain 
acceptance into the WTO.50 China’s accession and the resulting 
consequence provide a helpful background against which to 
compare the Basel II framework and how its implementation 
faces similar successes and difficulties.51 
Though China made great strides in reforming its banking 
system to gain accession into the WTO, their accession 
nevertheless came with several strings attached.52 In an 
unprecedented move evidenced by the lack of trust the 
international community still held toward China and its 
banking system (particularly in the area of reliable corporate 
finance and enforceable legal sanctions), the WTO designed a 
Transitional Review Mechanism (“TRM”) specifically for China. 
53 The fairly strict TRM called for annual meetings during 
China’s initial eight years “protection period,” during which 
China had to answer questions and challenges brought by other 
members.54 With the “probationary period” soon coming to an 
end55,China now has the opportunity to show the world that it is 
capable of solely regulating its economy, specifically its financial 
sector, under the strict standards of the international 
community.56 
 
 49. See ZHOU & LI, supra note 35, at xix n.2 (noting the PRC’s awareness that 
financial reforms need to be implemented); PENG, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing the 
need for China to reform its bank, especially in light of poor financial reviews from 
prominent international financial corporations). 
 50. See generally World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference Accession 
of the People’s Republic of China: Decision of Nov. 10, 2001, WT/21/432 (Nov. 23, 
2001) [hereinafter WTO Protocol] (listing financial changes China must make in 
order to gain full membership into the WTO); Bhala, supra note 45, at 1474 
(discussing the purpose and significance of the provisions enumerated in the 
protocol). 
 51. See PENG, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing the use of business history, which 
is the study of the operation and administration of business in the past, to explain 
and guide present and future business operations). 
 52. See generally WTO Protocol, supra note 50 (listing fulfilling obligations 
required of China in order for it to become a working member of the WTO). 
 53. Id. at § 18; FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 117. 
 54. FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 119–20. 
 55. See WTO Protocol, supra note 50, § 18(4) (stating that the TRM will only be 
in effect for the first eight years of China’s memberships). 
 56. See WTO Protocol, supra note 50, § 18(4) (stating that the TRM will only be 
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Part of this determination depends on the actions of the 
Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (“CBRC”) and its 
ability to use the legal power granted to it by the government 
and distance itself from the sometimes domineering presence of 
the Chinese Central Communist Party.57 While the government 
itself acknowledges “the distance between international [Basel] 
standards and the effectiveness of CBRC has noticeably 
decreased,” it still recognizes a distance remains.58 While 
complete compliance with the Basel II Revised Framework 
remains the goal, the question not often asked is whether full 
compliance will remedy the problems still troubling China’s 
financial system in general and the banking system in 
particular.59 
Basel II sets out a standardized framework for banks, with 
a major push for uniform adequate capitalization standards.60 
While the Second Pillar of the Basel II explicitly deals with the 
supervisory framework, the underlying philosophy of Basel II is 
that the capitalization standards serve as both a measuring 
stick for judging a bank manager’s risk management, and the 
punishing stick if they consequently fall below the prescribed 
levels.61 With a uniform measuring standard, nations will be 
better able to oversee their internal banking systems. Also, 
investors will be able to use the same measure to determine 
what banks are solid investment prospects or judge how well a 
nation is maintaining its domestic banking system.62 
 
in effect for the first eight years of China’s memberships). 
 57. See Wang Zhaoxing, China’s Banking Industry; Moving Forward in Accord 
with Reform & Opening, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS: CHALLENGES 
AND GLOBAL IMPACT 73, 82–84 (Zhu Min, Cai Jinqing & Martha Avery eds., 2009) 
(discussing CBRC’s implementation of programs with little to no interference from 
the CCCP). 
 58. Id. at 83. 
 59. Wilko Bolt & Alexander F. Tieman, When Basle II Doesn’t Work: 
Contingency Rules versus Fixed Requirements, THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY 3 (Feb. 
12, 2002), 
http://www.econometricsociety.org/meetings/esem02/cdrom/papers/952/NoteBankCo
mp3.pdf (“[I]n a complete information setting . . . the outcomes under the new Basle 
II capital adequacy framework will be Pareto inferior to the outcomes when a 
regulator assesses the risks in the asset portfolio of a bank and subsequently 
prescribes it a fixed CAR.”) 
 60. Basel II, supra note 10, at Introduction, ¶ 4. 
 61. Id. at Pillar II, ¶ 719–21 (discussing the applicable uses and purpose of 
creating a supervisory framework). 
 62. See id. at Introduction, ¶ 4 (noting that the underlying purpose and use of 
Basel regulations will help domestic banking systems and international 
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With respect to the supervisory review process, Basel II 
places the onus on bank management to develop transparent 
and systematic methods for assessing risk.63 The framework 
lists numerous factors that banks should use in developing 
these internal measuring devices, which should lead to greater 
uniformity across international banking systems.64 These 
factors and the framework as a whole have been revised in light 
of the recent global financial crisis.65 The revisions place greater 
emphasis on avoiding concentration of risk in specific market 
sectors,66 which is a problem that already plagues the Chinese 
financial system.67 In this instance, similar to China’s relatively 
unscathed escape from the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, 
China’s problems proved to be its protection.68 Because it lacked 
financial complexity and limited international investment, 
China’s separation from the outside world reduced its liability 
when the U.S. market began to plummet.69 
Though China has made much about its accelerated 
schedule for implementing the Basel II accord, it has been 
relatively silent on the exact measures it will take to implement 
the new framework, still not having released the specific 2009 
regulations to the public.70 An analysis of Basel II, however, 
provides a basis for analysis as to its effectiveness in reforming 
 
investments). 
 63. Id. at Pillar II, ¶ 721. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Revision to the Basel II 
Market Risk Framework ¶ 1 (July 2009) [hereinafter Basel II Revisions] (noting that 
the old framework did not take into account key risks, which the new framework 
does take into account). 
 66. Id. § V, ¶ 21(9)(c). 
 67. See Elizabeth Ho, Article, The International Effects of the Credit Crisis, 28 
Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 102, 110 (2009) (noting China’s heavy reliance on one 
particular sector, exports and manufactured goods). 
 68. See id. (noting that China’s conservative fiscal policies and heavy 
investments in one sector kept its economy safe from the international credit crisis). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Samuel Shen, Update 1 – China Chooses 7 Banks for Basel II Rules – 
Sources, Reuters (Mar. 3, 2009, 6:12AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSHA35421220090303 (noting that China wants 
to have banks implementing Basel II by the end of 2010); A search of rules and 
regulations that mention the term “bank regulations” five sources from 2009 
concerning bank regulations were retrieved. The available regulations neither 
mention Basel II nor resemble Basel II’s general framework for capitalization 
regulatory. The search, conducted September 27, 2010, is in the “iSinolaw Primary 
Resources” database, with a general keyword search of the term “bank regulations.” 
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Chinese banking corporate governance.71 Again, lack of 
transparency remains an issue.72 Furthermore, as with much 
international law, the Basel II accord provides few specifics as 
to how transgressions and failures to comply should be dealt 
with, either domestically or internationally.73 Though some will 
claim that the market will right itself in regards to inadequate 
capital levels in banks, there are still dangers for noncompliance 
with such widespread standards.74  The current global economic 
crisis highlights the interconnectedness of the economies of 
disparate nations.75 With regard to China, failure to develop a 
strong legal system with which to enforce the standards laid out 
in Basel II could lead to trouble worldwide.76 
D. CREATING THE CHINESE BANKING REGULATORY COMMISSION 
In order to better regulate the banking industry and 
improve the legal framework, while preventing the government 
from directly interfering with the business of banking, the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) created the Chinese Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC)–a supervisory body with 
powers to regulate the evolving banking world.77 It is no 
 
 71. See Kevin S. Buehler, Vijay D’Silva & Gunner Pritsch, The Business Case 
for Basel II, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (Feb. 2004), 
http://mkqpreview1.qdweb.net/Financial_Services/Banking/The_business_case_for_
Basel_II_1396 (discussing the use of the frameworks mentioned in Basel II as an 
analytical tool to hypothetically assess credit, market and operational risk, and how 
banks in turn should respond to such measurements). 
 72. See PENG, supra note 6, at 4 (noting the issue of transparency with Chinese 
governance). 
 73. See generally Basel II, supra note 10 (noting that Basel II provides a 
general supervisory process for domestic regulation and compliance measures, but in 
the end, largely relegates the duty of ensuring compliance, through the creation of a 
supervisory process, in the hands of bank supervisors). 
 74. Goksel Tiryaki, Basel Regulations, Economic Capital and Their 
Implications for the Turkish Banking Industry, 10(1) DOGUS UNIVERSITESI DERGISI 
J. 118,119–20 (2009), www.dwlogic.com/community/articles/Basel_Turkey.pdf. 
 75. But see Ho, supra note 67, at 102 (discussing that globalization and its 
accompanying effects is a misleading theory, because of the growing economic 
heterogeneity of different countries). 
 76. See id. at 110 (“In fact, China has become an attractive option for foreign 
direct investment within the last year as the full effects of the credit crisis have 
emerged.”); See also FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 22 (noting the 
success foreign banks have had in China after WTO accession, and the positive 
effect promulgations of rules and regulations have had on foreign involvement). 
 77. See Pieter Bottelier, The Evolution of Banking and Finance in China: 
Domestic & International Aspects, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS: 
CHALLENGES & GLOBAL IMPACT 53, 57 (Zhu Min, Cai Jinqing & Martha Avery eds., 
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coincidence that the creation came in the same year that the 
main Chinese banking laws were amended, and the year before 
a revised Basel II was released.78 Furthering the development of 
modernized banks, the NPC realized the need to divest the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) of its regulatory duties for two 
important reasons.  Firstly, in order to focus on developing more 
complex financial services and improve its ability to compete on 
an international level, the PBOC could not also be burdened 
with the responsibility of creating, implementing, and 
regulating banking policy for the whole country.79 Secondly, 
since the Central Government remained the majority 
stockholder in the PBOC, agency issues arose as to whether the 
bank could both monitor itself and others, in keeping with the 
regulatory goals of the government, while still attempting to be 
a competitive business, demanded by the government as 
primary stockholder.80 
The creation of the CBRC accomplished both of these goals. 
By assuming the regulatory responsibilities formerly held by the 
PBOC, the CBRC relieves the bank of those concerns.81 More 
importantly, with its sole charge being banking regulation, the 
CBRC is better able to focus on that task and is therefore more 
efficient in designing, implementing, and enforcing 
regulations.82 Also, as a regulatory body and not a state-owned 
business, the CBRC holds a different relationship with the 
Central Government.83 While it is still controlled by the 
government in the sense that it acts as a branch of the NPC, its 
goals and mission focus solely on regulation.84 The CBRC 
accomplishes these goal through disseminating regulations and 
guidelines, which have the same legally binding force as 
congressionally-approved statutes.85 Through these regulations 
 
2009) (noting establishment of an independent banking regulator). 
 78. See generally Id.; Basel II, supra note 10; Joseph J. Norton, Forward to 
ZHONGFEI ZHOU, BANKING LAWS IN CHINA ix, xi (Kluwer Law Int’l 2007) (noting 
2003 amendments). 
 79. Bottelier, supra note 77, at 57. 
 80. See Zhuang, Reform of State-Owned Commercial Banks, supra note 7. 
 81. See Bottelier, supra note 77, at 57 (noting that by assuming the regulatory 
responsibilities formerly held by the PBOC, the CBRC relieves the PBOC of those 
concerns, allowing it to focus more on other matters). 
 82. Zhaoxing, supra note 57, at 82. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (noting that the commission’s purpose is to properly supervise the 
banking industry). 
 85. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 17 (discussing the broad 
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the Commission effects changes including overseeing the 
implementing of the Basel II framework, which occurred 
primarily in two phases.86 
III. “VOLUNTARY” COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
China is moving away from its communist roots and into 
the international free market at a time where globalization is 
compelling the development of new requirements and standards 
for all countries, including those who have participated in the 
global market for centuries.  This places a new comer to the 
global market like China in a unique position to create a free-
market system that complies with emerging international 
standards. 
The largest challenge for China is building a reputation 
that other countries can trust.87 Increased investor confidence 
leads to increased investments, which leads to a stronger 
economy.88 Though countries are already eager to invest despite 
problems such as corruption and government interference, an 
open China with a trustworthy banking system would lead to an 
even stronger Chinese economy.89 Especially given the 
government’s reluctance to alter policies such as floating the 
yuan and its history of policy loans and “meddling” with the 
banking system, voluntary implementation reveals an 
encouraging change in China’s approach to the global economy. 
Basel II assists the SOCBs in strengthening their economic 
performance and reputational reliability through highly detailed 
and practice-oriented requirements and, perhaps surprisingly, 
through heavy reliance on self-regulation. 
 
regulatory powers of the CBRC, which largely draw from powers formerly held by 
the PBOC). 
 86. See id. at 21 (discussing the CBRC’s role in overseeing the implementation 
of Basel II). 
 87. See Zhou, supra note 35, at 217 (“[C]orruption, and the like have been 
frequently described as characteristics of the four biggest wholly state-owned 
commercial banks.”) 
 88. See Busy Week Ahead for U.S. Markets Amid Important Fundamentals, 
ecPulse, Sep. 26, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 19128413 (noting the relationship 
between investor confidence and investments). 
 89. See Lee, supra note 36, at 692 (claiming that an efficient financial sector 
will lead to economic growth and development). 
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A. BASEL II’S FRAMEWORK STRENGTHENS SOCB PERFORMANCE 
AND MITIGATES SOCB PROBLEMS 
Basel II provides specific provisions for calculating 
minimum capital requirements, designing proper risk 
management strategies and implementing sound supervisory 
review processes.90 The level of detail provided by the Basel 
Committee reflects the collective work of banking experts from 
around the world who have repeatedly tested and revised the 
framework over several years.91 The resulting regulation 
provides a framework whose specificity itself combats lingering 
banking problems facing China today—lack of transparency, 
threats of corruption, and even failure to fully comply with 
international regulations.92 
This is not to suggest Basel II contains overly rigid and 
unbending provisions requiring absolute submission of the 
world’s banks.93 Allowances for cultural and market differences 
lend the framework a degree of flexibility necessary for 
widespread acceptance and global compliance.94 The Basel 
Committee granted China and other developing countries an 
extended timeline for fully implementing the framework in 
recognition of the unfairness that would result in immediately 
holding those states to the same standard as developed 
countries.95 Pillar 1 of the Basel II framework even includes 
 
 90. See Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I and II, at 12, 26 and 158, available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm. 
 91. Basel II, supra note 10, Introduction. See also History of the Basel 
Committee and its Membership, BIS.COM, http://www.bis.g/bcbs/history.htm (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2010) (talking about the membership, the development process and 
testing) [hereinafter Basel Committee History]. 
 92. See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession 
Saga, 15 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1469, 1534 (2000) (“[T]he Chinese government has 
failed to implement fully the 1992 US-China trade agreements . . . because its trade 
laws and regulations lack ‘transparency’ and non-tariff barriers still exist.”); PENG, 
supra note 6, at 12, 16 (detailing several recent high profile corruption cases in 
China involving SBBCs). 
 93. See Basel II, supra note 10, Introduction, ¶ 6 (“It is not the Committee’s 
intention to dictate the form or operational detail of banks’ risk management policies 
and practices.”). 
 94. Id. § 2 (“The Committee expects its members to move forward with the 
appropriate adoption procedures in their respective countries.”). 
 95. See The Responses to the Press by the Senior Official of the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission on Issues Relating to the New Capital Accord, CBRC.GOV.CN 
(2004), http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=468 (explaining 
that “[Basel II] places the one-size-fit approach with a menu of options for countries 
to choose for calculation of capital adequacy.”). 
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alternative methods for calculating adequate capitalization and 
developing risk management depending on the type of market 
being regulated.96 Yet, even when providing alternative 
methods, Basel II details each plan with equal specificity. The 
Basel Committee’s ability to account for such differences 
illuminates the benefits of solely focusing on banking 
regulations.97 Obviously, the Committee deals exclusively with 
such issues, but this expertise allows it to be more specific than 
the WTO, which also oversees banking issues, though under its 
much larger purview of global trade regulation.98 Both 
organizations play important roles in shaping Chinese economic 
and trade policies.99 Unlike the broad WTO regulations, 
however, the Basel Committee’s framework narrows its 
regulatory gaze on specific aspects of banking, making it all the 
more effective in that area.100 With its sights trained on the 
Middle Kingdom, Basel II’s level of detail helps China overcome 
problems with its banking system and avoid historic roadblocks 
to implementation of international standards.101 
1. Capital Adequacy Specifically and Simply Defined 
The specificity of Basel II begins with its simply stated 
minimum capital requirement: “The total capital ratio must be 
no lower than 8%.”102 For China, this ratio provides a 
straightforward standard by which the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission and outside investors can evaluate 
 
 96. Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I, ¶ at 15 (“The Committee proposes to 
permit banks a choice between two broad methodologies for calculating their capital 
requirements for credit risk”). 
 97. See Basel Committee History, supra note 83, available at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (stating that the Committee pursues “two basic 
principles: that no foreign banking establishment should escape supervision; and 
that supervision should be adequate.”). 
 98. See What is the WTO?, WTO.ORG,  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (stating that “The goal 
[of the WTO] is to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers 
conduct their business.”). 
 99. WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China’s Accession, WTO.ORG, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm (quoting Minister Moore 
who said that “Now [China’s] economy will be subjected to the rules-based system of 
the WTO, something which is bound to enhance global economic cooperation . . . .”). 
 100. See Basel Committee History, supra note 83. 
 101. See supra note 13, at 114–15 (noting China’s problems complying with 
WTO transparency requirements). 
 102. Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar 1, at 12. 
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SOCBs.103 Basel II presents its ultimate goal in the first 
paragraph, though greater complexity and specificity lie in the 
calculation of that 8% standard.104 Guidelines for determining 
the standard’s two main components–capital assets and risk-
weighted assets–comprise the remaining one-hundred and forty-
five pages of the First Pillar.105 The sheer volume of material 
evinces the complex risk calculation of Basel II compared to 
Basel I, the whole of which totaled twenty-six pages.106 
While the “central focus” of Basel I was credit risk, Basel II 
adds operational risk and market risk in the total risk 
calculation.107 Each category of risk receives full explanation of 
the numerous factors banks must take into account in order to 
properly assess their risk and thereby adequately capitalize 
themselves.108 The provisions governing calculation of 
operational risk provide three avenues for calculation–the basic 
indicator approach, the standardized approach, and the 
advanced measurements approaches–and sets out specific 
parameters for each.109 For example, in laying out the second 
most stringent approach, the standardized approach, the 
framework states that banks must divide their activities into 
eight distinct categories, demands they calculate total capital 
charge with a multiple-year average, and even provides an 
“alternative standardized approach” in the footnotes.110 
2. Devil Is (Not) In the Details: Specificity as a Defense Against 
Corruption 
Basel II and its documentation requirements prevent 
SOCBs from only seeming to comply with the regulations.111 
Even after WTO accession, the Central Chinese Government 
 
 103. Id. (stating several times the need for proper documentation and ability of 
supervisors and investors to have access to the documents). 
 104. Id. at 15–157 (detailing proper methods for risk calculations). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards (Basel I) (1988), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf?nofram
es=1. 
 107. See id.; Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I at 12. 
 108. See Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I (detailing proper methods for risk 
calculations). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I at 139–40. 
 111. See KRISTOFF & WUDUNN, supra note 28. 
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used prudential loopholes in the WTO’s Annex of Financial 
Services to justify certain loans that banking branching 
restrictions and approval procedures would not otherwise 
allow.112 Through detailing the specific requirements of capital 
adequacy and risk management, Basel II shrinks such loopholes 
and provides a level of defense against corrupt directors.113 Its 
intricately planned framework and narrow focus on capital 
adequacy leave little room for corrupt or even ineffective 
directors to hide.114 Additionally, Basel II’s single focus demands 
a high level of banking expertise, which guards against wholly 
political appointments of SOCB directors.115 
The Commercial Banking Law and the Law Governing the 
People’s Bank of China deserve due credit for divorcing the 
government from the banks’ reforms, laying the groundwork for 
Basel II.116 The statutes added teeth to the regulations and 
imposed stiff penalties on managers who improperly used bank 
funds or engaged in other types of corruption.117 Those 2003 
amendments also created the China Banking Regulatory 
Committee (CBRC), which now oversees all banking, and 
implemented the Basel II framework through a series of 
guidelines and regulations.118 Basel II’s focus on capital 
adequacy provides the CBRC with a concise measurement by 
which it can judge SOCBs and evaluate corrupt managers.119 
Instead of capricious political judgments or nebulous statutes 
 
 112. See FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13, at 114–15 (blaming the 
vagueness of this WTO provision for enabling China to circumvent its own 
restrictions and procedures). 
 113. See Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar II (granting supervisors the ability to 
demand documentation of methodologies of bank managers and directors). 
 114. Id.; Cf. FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING, supra note 13 (claiming that the 
adequate capitalization requirements are too narrow and thus ineffectual). 
 115. Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I. See also PENG, supra note 6 (noting the 
political nature of past banking directors appointments). 
 116. See Lifa Fa Law on Commercial Banks (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 2003). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Decision on Institutional Restructuring of the Government Agencies 
under the State Council, April 28, 2003; Law on Banking Regulation and 
Supervision (2003) (granting the CBRC unambiguous powers over the banking 
industry); The Guidelines on the Implementation of the New Basel Accord by 
China’s Banking Sector (2007) available at 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=200703190C335698
6BEDAB3AFF45DA32BF983500. 
 119. Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I (detailing the requirement that must be 
included in any bank’s capital adequacy calculation methods). 
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that used to govern Chinese banks, Basel II’s beacon of capital 
adequacy slices through previously murky regulations, and 
exposes corrupt and inadequate bank managers and 
underperforming SOCBs.120 
3. Basel II Specificity Eases Implementation 
Chinese laws often promote grand ideals such as “safety, 
fluidity and efficiency,” but fail to explain how banks and 
businesses should attain them.121 While the Basel Committee 
commits itself to grand goals, in Basel II it provides a specific 
blueprint for countries and banks to follow and reach those 
broad goals.122 
Firstly, the specificity produces a type of ready-made 
regulatory system that works for their market and history and 
complies with the regulatory provisions.123 Furthermore, Basel 
II restricts the government’s ability to alter the regulations 
beyond recognition or undermine the larger goals of 
standardized international regulations.124 Such details benefit 
China since the framework provides not only goals, but specific 
methods for attaining those goals.125 
In a letter to the Chairman of the Basel Committee, the 
CBRC expressed China’s great desire to implement the new 
standards, but also pleaded for assistance in designing proper 
 
 120. See Law on Banking Regulation and Supervision (2003) (Article 4 listing 
“compliance, openness, impartiality and efficiency” as the guiding principles of 
supervision, but then failing to expand upon them). 
 121. See YANG, supra note 15. 
 122. See Basel II, supra note 15, at Introduction, ¶ 4 (“The fundamental 
objective of the Committee’s work to revise the 1988 Accord has been to develop a 
framework that would further strengthen the soundness and stability of the 
international banking system while maintaining sufficient consistency that capital 
adequacy regulation will not be a significant source of competitive inequality among 
internationally active banks.”). 
 123. Basel II, supra note 10, at Introduction, ¶ 7 (“[F]ramework also allows for a 
limited degree of national discretion in the way in which each of these options may 
be applied, to adapt the standards to different conditions of national markets.”). 
 124. See US TRADE REP., 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO 
COMPLIANCE (2007) [hereinafter 2007 REP. TO CONG.] (noting significant gaps 
between Chinese commitments under the WTO and corresponding laws). 
 125. See Letter to Jaime Caruana, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Chair, (July 31, 2003), available at 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=466 
 (stating that “the risk management of [Chinese] banks has begun to evolve at an 
accelerated pace.”) [hereinafter CBRC Letter]. 
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and adequate methods for applying them to their relatively 
simplistic yet evolving banking system.126 More than Basel I, 
WTO regulations or Chinese banking laws, Basel II provides the 
techniques and principles needed for obtaining the globally 
recommended ends of standardized, adequate and risk-sensitive 
capitalization.127 In China, such specificity assists in mitigating 
a wide array of banking and business regulatory problems, 




B. BASEL II’S DOCUMENTATION AND TRANSPARENCY 
REQUIREMENTS129 
Lack of transparency remains a major complaint from 
states and businesses doing business with China, especially 
those engaging with SOCBs.130 The more China opens up its 
economy to trade, however, the more other states will demand 
that they open up their ledgers and law books.131 Basel II not 
only requires greater transparency through its documentation 
requirements, but also specifically states the information that 
must be documented and who may access it.132 
For example, banks must document procedures used for 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Basel II, supra note 10, Introduction. 
 128. See supra note 116 (stating that “Basel is more about risk management 
than capital regulation . . .”); Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar II at 159 (explaining that 
proper supervision and corporate governance are necessary to implement a proper 
risk management system). 
 129. Basel II, supra note 10, Pillar I at 27, 34, 42, 82 and 86–87 (discussing, 
respectively, requirements for legal certainty, implementing qualitative criteria, 
standardized procedure, documented divergence from standard rating systems, and 
documented rating systems in general). 
 130. See WTO Protocol, supra note 50, at 2–3 (devoting an entire section 
dedicated to transparency). 
 131. See 2007 REP. TO CONG., supra note 124, at 11–12 (“When bilateral dialogue 
is not successful, the Administration will not hesitate to employ the full range of 
enforcement tools available.”). 
 132. See  Basel II, supra note 10, at Pillar II, ¶ 91 (highlighting that “individual 
assessments should be available to both domestic and foreign institutions”). 
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their chosen risk-weighing methodology, the designs of their 
ratings systems, reasons for employing multiple ratings 
systems, and processes utilized in developing their ratings 
systems, just to name a few.133 These detailed requirements 
alert China, and all Basel Committee members, not only to the 
high level of documentation required, but also to the formula 
used for risk calibration.134 Comparatively, the WTO accession 
agreement merely lists vague areas where documentation 
should be provided upon request of another member country.135 
IV. HOW DO YOU SAY “MINIMUM CAPITAL 
REQUIREMENTS” IN CHINESE?: TRANSLATING BASEL II 
INTO CHINESE LAW 
The demand for supervisory review fomented the creation of 
the CBRC in 2003.136 One of the first acts of the CBRC was 
releasing regulations incorporating Basel II principles.137 
Recently, that organization set forth guidelines for accelerated 
wholesale implementation of Basel II in all Chinese banks.138 
A. BASEL BEFORE BASEL – BASEL II IMPLEMENTATION FIRST 
PHASE 
Just months before the Basel Committee released Basel II, 
the CBRC issued capital adequacy provisions titled, “Regulation 
Governing Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks.”139 The 
regulation contains key components of Basel II, such as 
disclosure of information requirements and supervisory review 
 
 133. See id. at ¶ 43 (detailing the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to credit 
risk, for example). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See WTO Protocol, supra note 50, at 3 (“Replies to requests for information 
shall generally be provided within 30 days after receipt of a request.”). 
 136. See generally Law of the People’s Republic of China on Banking Regulation 
and Supervision (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 
2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007), 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/docVIEW.jsp?docID=2916. 
 137. See Regulation Governing Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks 
(promulgated by the Chinese Banking Regulatory Comm’n, Feb. 27, 2004, effective 
Mar. 1, 2004), http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=558 
(implicitly adopting Basle II guidelines) [hereinafter Capital Adequacy Regulation]. 
 138. See Guidelines, supra note 118 (establishing a timetable for Basel II 
implementation). 
 139. Capital Adequacy Regulation, supra note 137. 
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provisions,140 but does not mirror the complexity of capital 
adequacy calculation of Basel II.141 On the day the provision was 
released, a senior CBRC official spoke to the press about the 
goals of the regulation, citing Basel I and Basel II as the bases 
for the Chinese regulations, though admitting that the 
“Regulations” are transitional.142 This approach to Basel II 
shows the willingness of the Chinese government and the 
SOCBs to adopt better corporate governance standards, and 
some success has been achieved.143 Most importantly, these 
regulations prepared SOCBs and the banking industry as a 
whole for the more recent CBRC guidelines advising 
implementation of the Basel II framework.144 
B. THE FULL BASEL – CBRC IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL II AND 
RECENT PUSHES FOR FULL COMPLIANCE 
In 2007, the CBRC issued “The Guidelines on the 
Implementation of the New Basel Accord by China’s Banking 
Sector” (“Guidelines”), requiring large-scale banks, with 
operational entities in other countries or regions, and including 
those banks with a large proportion of international business, to 
implement the entire Basel II framework.145 The Guidelines 
caution that the “implementation of Basel II . . . should be 
proceeded gradually” and SOCBs should refrain from 
“irrationally rushing into the implementation.”146 While the 
regulations preach some caution, they also impute all the 
specific requirements of Basel II, such as the internal ratings 
based (“IRB”) approach, onto the large, international banks.147 
Instead of translating the provisions into separate regulations, 
 
 140. Id. at Ch. III , Art. 36, Ch. IV., Art. 43. 
 141. See id. (using a basic capital adequacy formula, but not the detailed 
formulae of risk management put forth in Basel II). 
 142. Senior official of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
Speaking to the Press on the Newly Issued Regulation Governing Capital Adequacy 
of Commercial Banks, 
http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/jsp/docView.jsp?docID=506 (last visited, Sept. 
25, 2010). 
 143. See Zhuang, Reform of State-Owned Commercial Banks, supra note 7 
(detailing progress of reform). 
 144. See Guidelines, supra note 118. (preparing SOCBs for the implementation 
of Basel II). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at II.ii. 
 147. See id. at IV (imputing the internal ratings approach to risk assessment). 
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the guidelines encourage SOCBs to implement Basel II as a 
whole.148 
Following their principles of methodical implementation, 
the 2007 Guidelines essentially gave the large-scale banks with 
operational entities in other countries or regions, and those 
banks with a large proportion of international business, until 
2013 to implement Basel II.149 Later, China surprised the global 
banking community by announcing that Chinese banks are 
likely to carry out Basel II by the end of 2010,150 perhaps 
spurred on by the amazing growth in China’s economy.151 While 
full implementation will prove beneficial for the global banking 
community, it does raise the question of why China accelerated 
their implementation, especially considering the state of the 
financial market over the past year. The reasons for the 
accelerated implementation also suggest answers to questions 
about whether China will in fact be faithful to the commitments 
Basel II demands. 
V. FULL COMPLIANCE 
Much focus on China’s emergence in the global market 
focuses on foreign countries’ desire to access the large, and 
largely untapped, market.152 On the flipside of that assumption, 
China wants to be part of the global market and is willing to 
comply with Basel II.153 While deficiencies in labor law 
compliance or copyright infringement may not stop a purchaser 
from buying goods made in China, banking is a service industry 
with different dynamics.154 China needs to address the 
 
 148. See id. at III.i (“Those large banks with operational entities in other 
countries or regions (including Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) and with large 
proportion of international businesses, should adopt Basel II.”). 
 149. Id. at V.iii. 
 150. Chinese Banks to Execute Basel II Before 2010, NANFANG DAILY, July 30, 
2009. 
 151. See Keith Bradsher, China’s Economy Roars Back, While U.S. Still Ails, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2009, at A4 (“The Chinese central bank said the county’s 
economy surged at an annual rate of 14.9 percent in the second quarter.”). 
 152. See JAMES MCGREGOR , ONE BILLION CUSTOMERS, 1–2, (2005) (noting the 
great potential of the largely untapped Chinese consumer market). 
 153. See CBRC Letter, supra note 125 (assuring the Basel Chairman that China 
will incorporate Basel II’s risk management provisions). 
 154. See Ann E. Christoff, The Chinese Automobile Industry and the World 
Trade Organization: China’s Non-compliance with WTO Regulations through Its 
Subsidizing of Automobile Manufacturers, 19 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 137, 137–
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discrepancies that run throughout its banking system.155 
Especially in the wake of the global economic crisis, proper risk 
management tops the list of investor and government concerns 
regarding the financial industry.156 With Basel II becoming the 
standard by which all nations and investors judge risk 
management (in its relation to capital adequacy), proper 
implementation becomes crucial for China and its SOCBs.157 
Thus, the economic benefits of complying with a globally 
recognized standard of risk management will reap rewards for 
China as it continues its ascendance in the global market.158  As 
to why China chose 2009 as the year to push for accelerated 
Basel II implementation, we must look to an earlier 
international agreement that also brought international 
standards to China: WTO accession.159 As mentioned above, the 
WTO created the Transitional Regulatory Mechanism as a 
special body to oversee Chinese compliance with WTO 
standards.160 Over the years, China has confronted allegations 
by several countries complaining about lack of compliance.161 
China has historically deflected, denied and sometimes 
implemented change in the face of such challenges.162 
 
38, 2009 (noting that despite non-compliance, China has still increased its 
automobile sales around the world since accession). 
 155. See generally Lee, supra note 36, at 729 (“The banking system operating in 
the CEA (Chinese Economic Area) needs work. China must develop a more stable 
banking system.”). 
 156. See Stephen Labatton, Fed Plans to Vet Banker Pay to Discourage Risky 
Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004 (“The Federal Reserve is working to ensure that 
compensation packages appropriately tie rewards to longer-term performance and 
do not create undue risks for the firm or the financial system.”). 
 157. See Lee, supra note 36, at 728 (“To create a sound and safe financial 
integration in the CEA, the implementation of the Basle Accords will be essential.”). 
 158. See id. at 708 (“Application of the Basle Accords to China’s banking 
regulation will allow China to adopt internationally recognized standards of banking 
supervision which, in turn, will encourage foreign banks to conduct business in 
China.”). 
 159. See generally WTO Protocol, supra note 50 (describing China’s accession to 
the World Trade Organization). 
 160. Id. (detailing the TRM). 
 161. See World Trade Org., Disputes by Country/Territory, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2010) (listing China as a respondent in twenty claims). 
 162. See World Trade Org., China: Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds363_e.htm (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2010) (providing an example of China’s willingness to adopt 
recommendations and rulings). 
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Significant to China’s Basel II implementation is that the eight 
year period under which China must answer to the TRM ends 
this year.163 This does not, however, mean China is completely 
free from WTO scrutiny, for in 2011, or possibly 2010, China 
will undergo its final TRM review.164 Considering multiple 
countries have raised issues during each year of China’s 
membership and this will be the final review, it is logical to 
presume China will come under stricter scrutiny than the 
previous years. 
While this final review does pose a challenge for China, it 
also represents an opportunity. As mentioned above, over the 
past few years Chinese businesses, including SOCBs, and the 
government, have recognized the need for greater corporate 
governance.165 If China is able to prove its banking industry 
meets the rigid Basel II standards, it should lead to better risk 
management.166 Firstly, Basel II compliance indicates a robust 
and modern financial system, which would answer questions 
about China’s ability to fully modernize a key industry, 
particularly with regards to SOCBs.167 Secondly, and more 
importantly, given the context of WTO review, full Basel II 
implementation would demonstrate China’s willingness and 
ability to comply with international standards, which has long 
been a question mark for the Middle Kingdom.168 Since a 
comprehensive TRM review will almost certainly raise questions 
of banking, and about SOCBs in particular, China is seizing the 
global stage to display its ability to reform and prove to the 
world it can be a trusted and sophisticated financial service 
partner.169 
 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See Guidelines, supra note 118. (concluding that Basel II is “consistent with 
the CBRC’s supervisory concept of principle based supervision”). 
 166. See CBRC Letter, supra note 125 (“We all believe that this rewarding 
exercise will yield long-term benefits both in terms of improved capital regulation 
and most importantly, better management of risks in banking.”). 
 167. See Bhala, supra note 45, at 1471 (noting that the Middle Kingdom is a 
second-rank power that has mastered the art of diplomatic theater”).theater”). 
 168. See id. at 1470 (“No country currently seeking WTO membership—Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, and Russia, for example—could possibly raise a more complex array of 
issues than the People’s Republic of China.”). 
 169. See Lee, supra note 36, at 727 (“If [China] fully adopts the Basle Accords, 
investors seeking to optimize the return on their investment would be free to buy, 
sell and trade in financial assets through the region.”). 
    170.  The Basel III regulations were released as this article was going to print. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the best efforts of countries such as China and 
organizations such as the Basel Committee, the ultimate test of 
international standards remains the marketplace. Basel II 
represents a common standard by which all banks, regardless of 
country of financial system, can be assessed. The risk 
management standards in particular will provide greater 
uniformity of practices throughout Chinese SOCBs that should 
mitigate, or at least make more difficult, the corrupt practices 
that have brought harm not only to the banks’ customers, but 
also to the reputation of the Chinese banking system as a whole. 
The government’s desire to voluntarily address these issues and 
implement Basel II should prove encouraging to those looking to 
do business with the Big Four in the future.170 
Questions still remain, especially considering whether or 
not the Central Government can be trusted to take its own 
members to task if and when violations occur. Aside from the 
financial and political impracticability of a watchdog 
organization, the best free market systems should regulate 
themselves.  Of course, no system is perfect, and regulation is 
necessary, but concern about national integrity, security, as well 
as a greater familiarity with one’s domestic system make host 
countries perhaps the best candidates to regulate their 
systems.171 Furthermore, Chinese SOCBs and the Central 
Government have a unique relationship. The regulators want to 
enforce the rules that have been domestically ratified. At the 
same time, the bank owners or majority shareholder wants the 
bank to be as financially free as possible and thus as profitable 
as it can be. With Chinese SOCBs, the regulators and majority 
shareholders are one in the same: the Central Chinese 
government. While this does open the possibility of regulators 
shirking responsibility for profit, the ultimate goal of increased 
international banking business should provide proper 
 
The CRBC stated that they see no short-term impact on China from the new 
regulations. See Esther Fung, China Banking Regulator: Basel III Won't Have 




 171. See Basel II, supra note 10, at Pillar II, ¶ 722 (“Supervisors are expected to 
evaluate how well banks are assessing their capital needs relative to their risks and 
to intervene, where appropriate.”). 
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motivation for the government to fulfill its dual roles with equal 
diligence. 
As in any industry, it is difficult to predict what future 
changes will occur in the global financial market. New financial 
products emerge constantly, some good (ATMs and online 
banking), some not (sub-prime housing loans). Whatever 
emerges, the global community must respond, and 
implementing standards such as Basel II prepare the world to 
better address changes and problems as they arise.  One of the 
largest question marks moving is China itself. Though market 
forces and international pressure can effect some change, the 
increasing power of China may cause China to grow impervious 
or indifferent to the cries of the outside world. For this reason, 
the internalization of certain standards, such as the Basel II 
accords, but also those in a variety of areas, may be the best 
instrument for ensuring global stability in the future.  This is 
not to suggest some nefarious plot of world domination by 
China, but we must acknowledge that the shifting of global 
powers has rarely been easy or peaceful. 
 
